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The inequality of labor market earnings in the U.S. has increased dramatically in recent 
decades. However, closer examination of the data reveals two distinct periods of rising 
inequality: 1973–89 and 1989–2005. The ﬁ  rst period was one of diverging wages throughout 
the distribution, while the second period was one of polarizing wage growth.
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It is widely recognized that inequality 
of labor market earnings in the United 
States has increased dramatically in 
recent decades. Over the course of more 
than three decades, wage growth was 
weak to nonexistent 
at the bottom of the 
distribution, strong 
at the top of the distri-
bution, and modest 
in the middle. While 
real hourly earnings 
of workers within the 
bottom 30% of the 
earnings distribution 
rose by no more than 
10 percentage points 
between 1973 and 
2005, earnings of 
workers at the 90th 
percentile rose by 
more than 40 per-
centage points.1 
What is less widely 
known, however, is 
that this smooth, 
monotonic growth of wage inequality 
is a feature of a speciﬁ  c time period—
and that this time period has passed.2 
Figure 1 shows that, consistent with com-
mon perceptions, the growth of wage in-
equality over the period 1973–89 was 
strikingly linear in wage percentiles, with 
sharp falls in real wages at the bottom 
of the distribution and modest increases 
at the top.3 Yet, starting in the late 1980s, 
the growth of wages polarized, with strong, 
ongoing wage growth in the top of the 
earnings distribution (at or above the 
70th percentile) and modest growth in 
the lower tail of the distribution (at or 
below the 30th percentile). Notably, 
the portion of the wage distribution 
that saw the least real earnings growth 
over the period 1989–2005 was the 
middle, roughly the group of earners 
between the 30th and 70th percentiles 
of the distribution.4 Thus, the periods 
of 1973–89 and 1989–2005 represent 
two distinct periods of rising inequality: 
the ﬁ  rst one of diverging wages 
throughout the distribution and the 
second of polarizing wage growth.
What explains the polarization of the 
last 15 years?5 It is fair to say that the 
question has not yet received an entirely 
satisfactory answer. One potentially 
promising—though surely incomplete—
explanation lies in the changing demand 
for job tasks spurred by the remarkable 
spread of computerization. The price 
of computer power has fallen by roughly 
one-third to one-half each year for several 
decades.6 Processing tasks that were 
unthinkably expensive 30 years ago, such 
as searching the full text of a university’s 
library for a single quotation, are now 
trivially cheap. This rapid, secular price 
decline creates enormous economic 
incentives for employers to substitute 
1. Change in real hourly earnings, 1973–2005
SOURCES: Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006); and author’s calculations based on data from 
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performing workplace tasks. Simultane-
ously, it creates signiﬁ  cant advantages for 
workers whose skills become increasingly 
productive as computerization advances.
But what are the tasks that computers 
perform? One is immediately tempted 
to answer, “Everything.” Indeed, it is hard 
to think of a quotidian activity—from 
checking the weather forecast to invest-
ing our retirement savings—that doesn’t 
involve using a computer in one way or 
another. Yet, although computers are 
everywhere, they don’t do everything—
far from it. In fact, computers have a 
very speciﬁ  c set of capabilities and lim-
itations. Ultimately, the ability of a com-
puter to accomplish a task is dependent 
upon the ability of a programmer to write 
a set of procedures or rules to tell the 
machine what to do at each possible 
contingency. This means that computers 
are good at the things that people can 
program them to do—and inept at 
everything else.
For example, computer programs can 
play an unbeatable game of checkers 
and a nearly unbeatable game of chess. 
These games follow well-described rules 
and so are reasonably straightforward to 
program. In the workplace, computers 
accomplish countless data processing 
and clerical activities, such as sorting, 
ﬁ  ling, calculating, storing, retrieving, and 
manipulating information. Similarly, com-
puters now handle many of the repeti-
tive assembly and monitoring tasks on 
the factory ﬂ  oor. I call these procedural, 
rule-based activities routine tasks.7
Yet, there are many essential tasks that 
workers perform daily for which pro-
grammers and engineers do not know 
the rules and therefore cannot program 
a computer to do. One such set of tasks 
is abstract thinking—e.g., developing a 
hypothesis, making a persuasive argu-
ment, creating a new idea or product, or 
motivating and managing a group of 
workers. These abstract thinking tasks 
require creativity, intuition, and insight. 
Though all of us have ideas and insights, 
the science of programming computers 
to do likewise is still in its infancy. Thus, 
for the moment, abstract thinking tasks 
require educated, creative, and clever 
people. Moreover, computerization likely 
raises the productivity of workers per-
forming abstract tasks. For instance, law-
yers accomplish faster and more thorough 
case research by tapping into legal data-
bases. Engineers develop products more 
quickly when assisted by computer-aided 
design tools. Financial professionals han-
dle much larger volumes of client money 
than was feasible in the paper-based era. 
There is abundant evidence that the 
demand for highly educated workers has 
increased in the computer era, and it is 
likely that the complementarity between 
computerization and abstract work is 
part of the explanation.
But education-intensive, abstract tasks are 
not unique in their (partial) immunity 
from automation. A second group of tasks 
that have proven remarkably hard to 
computerize are so-called manual tasks. 
These are tasks that require on-the-spot 
ﬂ  exibility and adaptability. Driving a truck 
through city trafﬁ  c, waiting tables at a 
restaurant, and checking passengers’ 
identiﬁ  cation at the airport—these are 
all tasks that are easy for people but hard 
for computers. Why? Because they require 
complex and rapid interactions with un-
predictable factors—erratic trafﬁ  c, hungry 
restaurant patrons, and unfamiliar faces. 
Importantly, these manual tasks do not 
require high levels of formal education.
One can potentially glimpse the impact 
that computerization—more recently 
complemented by international out-
sourcing (i.e., moving jobs overseas to 
take advantage of lower production 
costs)—is having on job tasks by consid-
ering the changing occupational struc-
ture of U.S. employment. We can look at 
all U.S. employment across six major, and 
very broad, occupational groups: manage-
rial and professional specialties; techni-
cians, sales, and administrative support; 
precision production, craft, and repair; 
service occupations; operators, fabrica-
tors, and laborers; and farming, ﬁ  shing, 
and forestry occupations. The highest 
skilled of these occupational groups is 
managerial and professional specialties, 
followed (by some distance) by techni-
cians, sales, and administrative support. 
The four remaining groups—each aver-
aging half the size of the ﬁ  rst two—are 
demonstrably less education-intensive. 
Whereas in the year 2000, high school 
dropouts made up 2.2% of employment 
in professional/managerial jobs and 
6.7% of employment in technical, sales, 
and administrative support jobs, they 
made up slightly over 20% of employ-
ment in the four remaining groups.
Growth has not been uniform across these 
six occupational groups. Figure 2 shows 
NOTES: Percent values show the occupational groups’ shares of overall employment. For details on the six occupational groups, 
see the text.
SOURCES: Autor and Dorn (2008); and author’s calculations based on data from the University of Minnesota, Minnesota Population 
Center, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series.
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that managerial and professional specialty 
occupations—the highest-skilled group—
experienced consistent, rapid growth 
between 1980 and 2005, gaining 7.1 per-
centage points as a share of overall em-
ployment between 1980 and 2005—a 30% 
increase. By contrast, employment in the 
middle-skilled group of technical, sales, 
and administrative support occupations 
showed an inverse U-shaped pattern over 
this period, expanding from 1980 to 
1990 and then contracting over the next 
15 years to below its initial 1980 level 
(consistent with the growing substitution 
of technology for routine tasks). Most 
strikingly, employment shares in three 
of the four low-skilled occupations fell 
sharply in each decade. Between 1980 
and 2005, farming, ﬁ  shing, and forestry 
occupations contracted by more than 
50% as a share of employment; operators, 
fabricators, and laborers contracted by 
33%; and precision production, craft, and 
repair occupations contracted by 19%.
Standing in sharp contrast to these pat-
terns of declining employment, however, 
is the experience of service occupations.8 
Despite being among the lowest-paid 
occupations requiring the least educa-
tion in the U.S. economy, employment 
in service occupations expanded in each 
decade between 1980 and 2005, rising 
from 11.0% of employment in 1980 to 
11.8% in 1990, to 13.7% in 2000, and to 
14.9% in 2005. This 35% increase over 
the 25-year span is 6 percentage points 
larger than the gain in employment 
shares of managerial and professional 
specialties during the same period. In 
fact, service occupations are also the only 
major occupational group that is growing 
among non-college-educated workers 
(i.e., those with a high school diploma 
or lower education).
What is special about service occupations? 
The largest categories within the service 
occupations group are food preparation 
and service; health service support (a 
category that excludes registered nurses 
and other skilled medical personnel); 
and buildings and grounds cleaning and 
maintenance. These are low-paying jobs; 
in the year 2005, 75% of them had hourly 
wages below the overall hourly median. 
From the perspective of our conceptual 
framework, what distinguishes these 
occupations is that each is highly inten-
sive in nonroutine manual tasks—activities 
requiring interpersonal and environmen-
tal adaptability yet little in the way of for-
mal education. These are precisely the 
job tasks that are difﬁ  cult to automate 
with current technology because they are 
nonroutine. Moreover, these jobs are dif-
ﬁ  cult to outsource because, in large part, 
they must be produced and performed 
in person (at least, at the moment).
Employment projections from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) sup-
port the view that low-education service 
jobs are likely to be a major contribu-
tor to U.S. employment growth going 
forward.9 The BLS forecasts that em-
ployment in service occupations will in-
crease by 5.3 million, or 19%, between 
2004 and 2014.10 The only major occu-
pational category with greater projected 
growth is professional occupations, which 
are predicted to add 6 million jobs, a 
21.2% increase.11 Like all forecasts, these 
should be treated as tentative. Histori-
cally, the BLS has underpredicted the 
growing demand for professional and 
managerial occupations.12
Conclusion
This process of employment polariza-
tion—in which job growth is concentrated 
among both highly education-intensive 
abstract jobs and comparatively low- 
education manual jobs—presents both 
challenges and opportunities for the U.S., 
as well as other industrialized economies. 
The rising productivity of highly educat-
ed workers is good news; the return on 
investments in higher education has per-
haps never been greater. But the growing 
importance of manual and service tasks 
presents a challenge. The positive news 
about rising demand for in-person service 
occupations is that it will tend to increase 
the earnings of less educated workers. 
The less favorable news is that, even given 
rising demand, labor supply to services 
may be sufﬁ  ciently elastic that wages stay 
low. Median real hourly wages in service 
jobs were $8.86 in 1980, $9.01 in 1990, 
$10.24 in 2000, and $10.28 in 2005 (all 
expressed in 2005 dollars).13 These hourly 
wage rates imply annual, full-time earnings 
of approximately $20,000 per year (of 
course, many service jobs do not provide 
full-time, full-year earnings). This income 
level exceeds the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
ofﬁ  cial poverty threshold for the year 
2005 of $19,806 for a family of two adults 
and two dependent children.14 Yet, this 
is probably insufﬁ  cient for families to 
make optimal investments in child rearing 
and education.
It appears a legitimate worry that the 
ongoing polarization of earnings levels 
among U.S. households will ultimately 
serve to thwart economic mobility among 
subsequent generations. Unfortunately, 
the impact of current economic inequality 
on future mobility cannot be judged 
until decades after the die is cast. Thus, 
investments in insuring the economic 
mobility of the next generation are 
necessarily precautionary—but perhaps 
a precaution worth taking.
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